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|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|lastlast1 = Aghion
|firstfirst1 = Philippe
|last2 = Bolton
|first2 = Patrick
2,399 ⟶ 2,400行目:
|doi = 10.2307/2297860
}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|lastlast1 = Akerlof
|firstfirst1 = George A.
|authorlinkauthor-link1 = ジョージ・アカロフ
|year = 1970
|title = The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
2,411 ⟶ 2,413行目:
|doi = 10.2307/1879431
}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Aoki
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|isbn = 0199241015
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Aoki
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|accessdate = Sep 22, 2016
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Aoki
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|isbn=0198292139
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Aoki
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|year = 1994
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Arrow
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|doi = 10.2307/1907353
}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = William J.
2,487 ⟶ 2,495行目:
|isbn = 0853280312
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|lastlast1 = Binmore
|firstfirst1 = K.
|author-linklink1 = ケン・ビンモア
|year = 1998
|title = Book Review: The Complexity of Cooperation by Robert Axelrod
2,503 ⟶ 2,512行目:
|accessdate = 2016年8月
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|lastlast1 = Binmore
|firstfirst1 = K.
|author-linklink1 = ケン・ビンモア
|title = Game theory: a very short introduction
|publisher = Oxford University Press
2,527 ⟶ 2,537行目:
|isbn = 978-4- 00 - 026903- 2
}})
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|lastlast1 = Borel
|firstfirst1 = Émile
|authorlinkauthor-link1 = エミール・ボレル
|year = 1921
|title = La théorie du jeu et les équations intégrales à noyau symétrique gauche
2,540 ⟶ 2,551行目:
|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|firstfirst1 = Émile
|lastlast1 = Borel
|authorlinkauthor-link1 = エミール・ボレル
|chapter = Note IV. Sur les jeux où interviennent le hasard et l'habileté des joueurs
|year = 1924
2,551 ⟶ 2,563行目:
|publisher = Paris : Librairie Scientifique Hermann
}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|firstfirst1 = Émile
|lastlast1 = Borel
|authorlinkauthor-link1 = エミール・ボレル
|title = Sur les systèmes de formes linéaires à determinant symérique gauche et la théorie générale de jue
|year = 1927
2,561 ⟶ 2,574行目:
|volume = 184
}}
 
*{{Citation|洋書
|last1 = Boyd
2,574 ⟶ 2,588行目:
|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|lastlast1 = Brams
|firstfirst1 = Steven J.
|title = Biblical Games: Strategic Analysis of Stories of the Old Testament
|year = 1980
2,582 ⟶ 2,597行目:
|isbn = 0262021447
}}
 
*{{Citation|洋書
|first1 = Timothy F.
2,595 ⟶ 2,611行目:
|doi = 10.2307/2298085
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*{{Citation|洋書
|first1 = Timothy F.
2,608 ⟶ 2,625行目:
|doi = 10.1016/0304-4076(91)90032-9
}}
 
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|firstfirst1 = Arthur H.
|lastlast1 = Copeland
|title = Review of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
|year = 1945
2,619 ⟶ 2,637行目:
|doi = 10.1090/S0002-9904-1945-08391-8
}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Davis
2,632 ⟶ 2,651行目:
|year = 1965
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = Rajat
2,647 ⟶ 2,667行目:
|doi = 10.1007/BF01247101
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Debreu
2,661 ⟶ 2,682行目:
|doi = 10.2307/2525306
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Dixit
2,682 ⟶ 2,704行目:
|isbn =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = Douglas W.
2,694 ⟶ 2,717行目:
|year = 1983
|doi = 10.1086/261155}}
 
*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = Richard
2,707 ⟶ 2,731行目:
|doi = 10.2307/2297841
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|last1 = Farrell
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|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|firstfirst1 = Tamás
|lastlast1 = Fleiner
|title = A fixed-point approach to stable matchings and some applications
|pages = 103 - 126
2,731 ⟶ 2,757行目:
|doi = 10.1287/moor.28.1.103.14256
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|firstfirst1 = M. M.
|lastlast1 = Flood
|title = Some Experimental Games
|pages = 5 - 26
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|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = Drew
2,754 ⟶ 2,782行目:
|isbn = 978-0262061414
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = A.
2,766 ⟶ 2,795行目:
|doi =
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|first1 = Clive W. J.
2,778 ⟶ 2,808行目:
|asin = B0006C2SWU
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|first1 = Sanford J.
2,791 ⟶ 2,822行目:
|doi = 10.1086/261404
}}
 
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|last = Harsanyi
2,803 ⟶ 2,835行目:
|doi =
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|last1 = Harsanyi
|first=John C.
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|authorlink=ジョン・ハーサニ
|author-link1 = ジョン・ハーサニ
|year=1975
|year = 1975
|title=Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls's theory
|title = Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls's theory
|journal=American Political Science Review
|journal = American Political Science Review
|volume=69
|volume = 69
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|pages = 594 – 606
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|author-link1 = ジョン・ハーサニ
|year=1976
|year = 1976
|title=Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation
|title = Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation
|isbn=978-90-277-1186-1
|isbn = 978-90-277-1186-1
|publisher=Springer Netherlands
|publisher = Springer Netherlands
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|last=Harsanyi
|last1 = Harsanyi
|first=John C.
|first1 = John C.
|authorlink=ジョン・ハーサニ
|author-link1 = ジョン・ハーサニ
|year=1977
|year = 1977
|title=Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
|title = Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations
|publisher=Cambridge University Press
|publisher = Cambridge University Press
|isbn=9780521311830
|isbn = 9780521311830
}}
 
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|last1=Harsanyi
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|first1=John C.
|authorlink1author-link1 = ジョン・ハーサニ
|last2 = Selten
|first2 = Reinhard
|authorlink2author-link2 = ラインハルト・ゼルテン
|title = A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games
|publisher = MIT Press
|location = Cambridge, Massachusetts
|year = 1988
|isbn = 9780262081733
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|first1=Oliver
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|last1=Hart
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|first2=John
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|last2 = Moore
|year=1988
|year = 1988
|title=Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
|title = Incomplete contracts and renegotiation
|journal=Econometrica
|journal = Econometrica
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|pages=755–785
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|doi=10.2307/1912698
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|last2 = Moore
|year=1999
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|title=Foundations of incomplete contracts
|title = Foundations of incomplete contracts
|journal=Review of Economic Studies
|journal = Review of Economic Studies
|volume=66
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|pages=115–138
|pages = 115 – 138
|doi=10.1111/1467-937X.00080
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|last=Hotelling
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|first=Harold
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|author-link=ハロルド・ホテリング
|author-link1 = ハロルド・ホテリング
|year=1929
|year = 1929
|title=Stability in Competition
|title = Stability in Competition
|volume=39
|volume = 39
|issue=153
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|journal=The Economic Journal
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|first1=Shih-Hsun
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|last1=Hsu
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|first2=Chen-Ying
|last2 = Hung
|first3 = Cheng-Tao
|last3 = Tang
|title = Minimax play at Wimbledon: Comment
|pages =517–523 517 – 523
|journal = American Economic Review
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|issue = 1
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|author-link = レオニード・ハーヴィッツ
|title=The theory of economic behavior
|title = The theory of economic behavior
|year=1945
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|pages=909–925
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|journal=American Economic Review
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|title=What has happened to the theory of games
|title = What has happened to the theory of games
|year=1953
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|year=1965
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|title=Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization
|title = Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization
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|journal=Econometrica
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|title=A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
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|title=Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices
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|title=Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
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|title=Equilibrium Points in N-person Games
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*{{Citation| 洋書
|title=Non-cooperative Games
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|title=Two-person Cooperative Games
|title = Two-person Cooperative Games
|journal=Econometrica
|journal = Econometrica
|year=1953
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|pages=128–140
|pages = 128 – 140
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